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In this work we analyze a web search market where there is real
competition between search engines (which also are advertising
agencies). We will show that in this kind of market the revenue of
the search engines depends on the precision of the predictions of
users’ preferences and that advertisers and search engines’ users
can gain from the competition between search engines.
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IVIntroduction
In recent years a new discipline named computational advertising emerged
[12, 13]. The aim of this discipline is to merge the knowledge of different
topics like microeconomics, information retrieval, auction theory and machine
learning to ﬁnd the best match between a given user in a given context and a
suitable advertisement.
This discipline is very important over the Internet to ﬁnd optimal strate-
gies for contextual advertising. This kind of advertising tries to infer the user
preferences in order to tailor the advertising to the user. The idea is that if
the user is interested in the product advertised it is more likely that he will
pay attention to the advertising.
We can divide contextual advertising into two categories: the ones that
appear on normal websites and the ones that are shown on the result pages
of search engines. The latter are usually called sponsored search. The main
search engines (i.e. Google, Yahoo, Bing) give two sets of results to a user
query: organic results and sponsored results. Organic results are given by
the search engines according to some ranking algorithms (e.g. PageRank [10])
that ranks websites according to their relevance to the keyword searched by
the user. Sponsored results take also into consideration how much the website
is paying the search engine in order to be shown among the sponsored results.
In this thesis we will analyze a market where there are many search en-
gines offering sponsored search and where the user and the websites can
chose which one to use in order to maximize their revenue. We will see that
the revenue of the search engine will be less easy to obtain and it will be re-
lated to its ability to predict user preferences. The model also allow users and
websites to earn money from sponsored search.
1CONTENTS
In Chapter 1 we will give an overview of the search engine market. In
Chapter 2 we will deﬁne the model describing the entities involved, how they
interact and how they measure their revenue. In Chapter 3 we will see how
different level of accuracy in user preference prediction leads to different rev-
enue for the search engines. Finally in Chapter 4 we will summarize the
results and we will analyze limit and strengths of the model.
2Chapter 1
The sponsored search Market
In this chapter we describe the situation of the web search market, the enti-
ties involved and the economical relevance of this market. We will see that
few forces dominate the market and that the competition is not enough to
avoid abuse of market power.
1.1 Organic search
The main function of a web search engine is to provide links as result to a
query based on what it is available on the web. Most of the results a search
engine provides are organic search results. Those results should be distin-
guished from paid search results (Fig. 1.1) that we will discuss in the follow-
ing sections.
In order to provide organic results search engines regularly explore the
web and rank its content. The ways the exploration and the ranking are
exactly done are conﬁdential business secrets, anyway some basic principles
are usually followed:
 Crawling and indexing. Search engines crawl the web and create an
index of web site content [3]. When a query is submitted, the search
engine try to match the keyword used in the query to the index in order
to provide relevant results.
 Reputation. A measure of the reputation of a website is really impor-
tant in order to rank websites providing similar content. In this way the
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search engine can provide to the user the best results available. Usually
reputation is commonly measured by the number of links on other web
sites that point to it. In particular, links from popular web sites improve
the ranking of a speciﬁc web site [10].
 Past user behaviour. Information about previous search queries is
used to improve search results [2].
 Personalized search. At each query search engines receive additional
information about the user (IP, browser type, language, cookies). This
information is used to tailor search results to the user and improve the
quality of results [7]. For example the IP address can be used to narrow
down the results according to the location of the user.
1.2 Web search and advertising
The aim of search engines is to make the information available on the
Internet easily available to the users. That is usually provided free of
charge for the users so, in order to turn this business proﬁtable the
search engine had to start to sell users’ attention to advertisers. In fact
by submitting a query to the search engine, a user provides information
about his current interests to the search engine. Those information are
really useful for advertisers that can adapt their advertises to user’s in-
terests. From providing those information to advertisers search engines
started to be proﬁtable.
Among with normal search results, search engines provided something
named "sponsored links" (see Figure 1.1). The difference between nor-
mal results and sponsored links is that the website has to pay the search
engine for appearing among sponsored links when the users look for a
speciﬁc keyword. The mechanism to sell those slots is called slot auction.
The beneﬁt for advertisers is that they have the possibility to advertise
websites that can be interesting for the users. In this way the advertis-
ing is more effective. In Figure 1.1 we see that the user is looking for an
used car and that the proposed advertising is about used cars vendors.
41.2 Web search and advertising
Figure 1.1: Sponsored links on the right, organic results on the left
1.2.1 Slot auction
Advertising slots are sold in auctions where advertisers submit bids for
keyword combinations. Each such bid indicates the willingness of an
advertiser to pay for every time that users click on an ad shown as a
result of a query for a speciﬁc keyword or a combination of keywords.
Advertisers pay for each click on the sponsored link and this gain goes
to the search engine.
Many mechanisms for auction have been developed. The scheme most
of the search engines uses is Generalized Second-Price (GSP)[4]. In this
scheme advertiser who submits the highest bid wins the best slot but
pays only the second-highest bid. In the same way, the second highest
bidder wins the second-best slot and pays the third-highest bid price,
etc.
Another auction scheme is Vickrey–Clarke–Grove (VCG)[9]. This scheme
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is more complicated but has an important property GSP doesn’t have: it
is truth-telling [5]. This means that bidding the real value is a dominant
strategy for advertisers. This beneﬁts the advertisers since it no longer
encourages them to invest into bidding robots to game the system. The
con for search engines is that if advertisers bid the same amounts un-
der GSP mechanism and under VGC mechanism than the search engine
revenue will be higher in the former case rather than in the latter [4].
1.3 Competition
1.3.1 Market share
The web search market can be separated into different countries . Ta-
ble 1.2 shows market shares of the biggest providers in web search in
selected countries. All markets are highly concentrated. With the excep-
tion of Russia, the largest provider in each market has secured a share
of between 60 and 90 percent. Google is the market leader in most coun-
tries including the US, the UK, France and Germany.
USA UK France Germany China Russia
Google (65.0%) Google (91.3%) Google (89.8%) Google (86.6%) Baidu (60.9%) Yandex (47.4%)
Yahoo! (20.1%) Yahoo! (2.8%) MSN+Live (2.9%) MSN+Live (6.0%) Google (27.0%) Google (31.2%)
MSN+Live (8.0%) Ask (1.7%) Yahoo! (2.5%) Yahoo! (2.7%) Sogou (3.1%) Rambler (9.7%)
Ask (3.9%) Live(0.9%) AOL (1.7%) T-Online (1.8%) Yahoo (2.4%) Mail.ru (7.0%)
Figure 1.2: Market share by search queries. Sources: USA (ComScore, 2009),
UK (Hitwise UK, 2009), France (At Internet Institute, 2009), Germany (Web-
hits, 2009), China (China IntelliConsulting, 2008), and Russia (ComScore,
2008b). [11]
1.3.2 Reasons of market concentration
Market concentration is mainly driven by three features of the web
search market:
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Cost structure of a search engine business
The cost structure in the search engine market is characterized by high
ﬁxed costs for Research & Development as well as hardware and soft-
ware infrastructure and almost zero variable cost for providing an ad-
ditional query or placing an additional advertisement. Industry experts
estimate the minimum value to start a search engine business and pay-
ing off the ﬁxed costs as 2 billion USD [11]. Even with such an amount
of resources the competition will be hard with the market leaders. In
2010 Google spent 3.7 bilion USD for R&D (7.8 % of its revenue) [6],
Yahoo did 1.08 bilion USD (17 of its revenue)[6].
Prevalence of network effects
In economic theory, a positive network effect describes a situation where
the value of a good or service for individual consumers increase with the
total number of consumers. In this case we can say that the quality
of the service provided by a search engine increase with the number
of users. As we have described in Section 1.1 search engines use past
queries to increase the quality of results. So users see an increasing of
quality of the service with the increasing of the number of users. The
same happens for advertisers: increasing the number of users increases
the probability of ﬁnding a good match with a possible costumer so it
increases the quality of the service the search engine provides to ad-
vertisers. The presence of positive network effects for both users and
advertisers creates a positive feedback loop in which a search engine
becomes more valuable to users and advertisers as more users join.
Inertia of users to switch to another search engine
Typically, users cannot fully assess the quality of search results and
use search engines without knowing how its search algorithm works.
Instead, they mainly trust a search engine’s choice and believe in its
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quality. Web search can therefore be considered a credence good1, since
users need to develop trust based on the reputation of a search engine
as well as on their previous experiences. For users, switching to an-
other search engine means losing the brand reputation of their previous
provider. Since Google and Yahoo! are listed among the most valuable
global brand names[8] it can be assumed that the costs of switching
away from one of the major web search engines are very high.
1.3.3 Bargaining Power
The market of sponsored search is economically really relevant. Google’s
revenue from sponsored search is 2010 was 19.5 bilion USD[6], in the
same Yahoo’s revenue from sponsored search has been of 3.2 bilion USD[14].
This revenue come from GSP mechanism. As we stated in Section 1.2.1,
this auction mechanism maximize search engine revenues but it is harder
to manage for advertisers. The fact that the main search engines (i.e.
Google and Yahoo) use GSP instead of VCG shows that the strong con-
centration of forces in very few number of search engines leads to an
asymmetry in the bargaining power of search engine, users and adver-
tisers that put the search engines in a very strong position. This can
also leads to a potential risk of abuse of market power [11].
In the next chapter we will build a model of the web search market
where many entities offer sponsored search and we will see how the
distribution of bargaining power would be more equilibrated.
1products whose quality is difﬁcult to assess even after they are consumed. Other examples
of credence goods are services provided by doctors, car repair, or legal consulting.
8Chapter 2
Model
In this section we will introduce a model for the web search market. We
can divide the set of actors in the market in 3 subsets: users, search
engines and websites. Each entity has its own utility and acts in the
market to maximize it. We will analyze how this market behaves and
what are the equilibria.
2.1 Entities interaction
There are 3 sets of actors: a set U of users, a set E of search engines, and
a set W of websites. We denote by u 2 U , e 2 E and w 2 W respectively
a user, a search engine and a website.
A user u can perform a search query qu = (eu;ku) to a search engine eu
using a keyword ku . The search engine e answers the user with a set Vu
of websites. Each search engine e has its own algorithm to decide which
websites include in Vu . We assume that jVuj = T is ﬁxed for the system,
which means that each search engine visualizes the same number of
websites as an answer to a query.
A website can ask a search engine to be indexed (i.e. to have the pos-
sibility to be visualized by that search engine as a result to a search
query).
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Each user u assigns a value k
uw to a website w (i.e., k
uw is high if the
the user u is happy to visualize the website w as a result for a query
when looking for keyword k ). In the same way each website w assigns
a value !k
wu to a visualization received by the user u (i.e. !k
wu is high if
the website w is happy to be visualized as a result from a query from the
user u when it looks for the keyword k ).
Each website w decides whether it wants to have the possibility to be
shown as result of a query for a keyword k by the engine e . If it does, it
makes a bid to the search engine bk
ew for the keyword k. This will affect
the chances to get visualized as we will show in Section 2.3. Each time
the website w is visualized to a user u by the engine e for the keyword k
it pays (or get payed if the value is negative)  k
euw. This values is decided
by the search engine as we will show in section 2.3
The user decides which search engine to use. The user u pays (or get
payed if the value is negative) k
euw for each websites he/she see as result
for a query to the search engine e for the keyword k. So it actually pays
P
w2Vu k
euw for each query. The value of k
euw is decided by the search
engine as we will show in section 2.3.
We call a round an interval of time in which each user select a search
engine, does a query on it and get an answer from it. Given the set U of
users we get, for each round the following sets
– Q =

q1; ;qjUj
	
the set of all the queries qu = (eu;ku)
– V =

V1; ;VjUj
	
the set of all the answers to each query Vu(qu) =
fw1; ;wTg
We have that jUj = jQj = jV j
We also introduce two combined parameters:
– k
uew = k
uw + bk
ew is the bid-value
– 
k
uw = k
uw + !k
wu is the match-value
102.2 Gain
2.1.1 A note about the users
The model is ﬁne-grained enough to represents all the users of the search
engines as independent entities. On the other hand search engine will
hardly consider each user as different entities. What search engines
usually do is consider a set of user as one "kind of user". That means
that the search engine can, for example set the group of users that study
computer science as the "computer science student" kind of user. So it
will deal with all the users in this set as they are the same u 2 U.
So, in the following sections we will indifferently refer to a u 2 U either
as a user or a kind of user.
2.2 Gain
We assume that at each round all the users u 2 U make a query qu =
(eu;ku) to a search engine eu for the keyword ku . For each entity (users,
websites and search engines) we deﬁne a gain on the round. The gain
on the round is high if the entity is happy after that round. We deﬁne
respectively gu, gw and ge the gain for users, websites and search engines
for each round.
– gu =
P
w2Vu(k
uw  k
euw) where w are the websites visualized by the
engine e as an answer for the query for the keyword k done by the
user u
– gw =
P
u:w2Vu(!k
wu    k
euw) where u is in the set of users that have
visualized the website w as result for a query for the keyword k ,
and e is the engine that have been used
– ge =
P
u:qu=(e;ku)
P
w2Vu(k
euw +  k
euw) where u is in the set of users
that have visualized the website w as result for a query for the
keyword k using the engine e
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2.2.1 Surplus value
We deﬁne a value for the system that represents the sum of the gains
of all the entities in a round. We call it system surplus value and we
indicate it with S. Let’s calculate it
S =
X
u2U
gu +
X
w2W
gw +
X
e2W
ge
X
u2U
gu =
X
u2U
X
w2Vu
(k
uw   k
euw)
X
w2W
gw =
X
w2W
X
u:w2Vu
(!k
wu    k
ew) =
X
u2U
X
w2Vu
(!k
wu    k
ew)
X
e2E
ge =
X
e2E
X
u:qu=(e;ku)
X
w2Vu
(k
eu +  k
ew) =
X
u2U
X
w2Vu
(k
eu +  k
ew)
So
S =
X
u2U
gu +
X
w2W
gw +
X
e2W
ge =
X
u2U
X
w2Vu
k
uw + !k
wu =
X
u2U
X
w2Vu

k
uw
That means that the game is not zero-sum. The surplus value for each
round is the sum of the matching-value 
k
uw = k
uw +!k
wu for each match-
ing (u;w) between users and websites that is created by the system (all
the search engines).
Notice that this result does not depend on the way the engines decide
the payments. That is the surplus value does not depend on the values of
k
euw and  k
euw. We can than state that the Surplus value is a function of
the matching between users and websites and that it actually measures
the quality of this matching.
It is also interesting to deﬁne the engine surplus value that we indicate
as Se as
Se = ge +
X
u:qu=(e;ku)
gu +
X
w:(w2Vu);qu=(e;ku)
gw
That is the sum of the gain of the search engine e and of the other en-
tities from using the search engine e. We also have that Se is the sum
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of the matching-values of the websites visualized to the users making
queries to that search engine e, that is
Se =
X
u:qu=(e;ku);w2Vu

k
uw
and that the sum of all the engine surplus values is the system surplus
value
S =
X
e2E
Se
Of course we have that if there is just one search engine the engine
surplus value and the system surplus value are the same. In this case
we indicate it as just surplus value.
2.3 Slot auction
2.3.1 Motivation
We said that each search engine shows T results as an answer to a query
for a speciﬁc keyword. It usually happens that more than T websites
want to be shown as a result for a speciﬁc keyword. So the search engine
needs a way to select T of them to be shown. We call a place in the result
page a slot (so there are T slots for each query) and the mechanism to
assign the slots a slot auction.
At each round we want to maximize the system surplus value. In this
way there is more gain to distribute among the entities. In order to do
that each search engines have to select the T websites that maximize
the engine surplus value. We have shown in Section 2.2.1 that the en-
gine surplus value is equal to the sum of the match values of each shown
website. So the search engines have to show the best T websites accord-
ing to 
k
uw = k
uw + !k
wu. The problem is that the search engine does not
know this value. It can have an estimation of k
uw but not about !k
wu.
The former is in fact what actually search engines use in the real world
to rank the websites (i.e. Google’s pagerank) while the latter depends
on the business structure of the website and it is related to the return
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on investment of the visualization of the website in a result page. So the
search engine need a strategy to know !k
wu.
2.3.2 Slot auction mechanism
We will now show an auction mechanism that maximize the engine sur-
plus value and make the search engine to know the exact value of !k
wu.
When a user u makes a query for the keyword k to the search engine e
the slot auction happens as following:
1. The search engine knows each website bid bk
ew and an estimation of
the user value k
uw for the websites.
2. The search engine order all the websites in descending order ac-
cording to the bid-vales k
uew = k
uw + bk
ew.
3. It selects the ﬁrst T websites according to this rank and put them
in the results set Vu. We call 
k
ue the bid-value of the ﬁrst websites
not selected (i.e. the websites in position T + 1 in the rank)
4. The search engine asks each website that is in the result set Vu to
pay  k
euw
5. The search engine asks the user to pay k
euw for each visualized
website.
2.3.3 The website payment
We have to deﬁne the website payment ( k
euw). We set it to
 k
euw = bk
ew   (k
uew   
k
ue)
and we show that in this way we get what we were looking for in Section
2.3.1.
Lemma 2.3.1. This auction mechanism is truth-telling. That is bidding
bk
ew = !k
wu is a dominant strategy for a website.
Proof. We want to prove that a dominant strategy for a website is to
bid its real value for the slot. That is bidding bk
ew = !k
wu is a dominant
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strategy. Let’s assume that all the websites made their bid for a keyword
k to the search engine e, the search engine made the ranking and that

k
ue is the bid-value in position T + 1 in the ranking. For a website w we
can have the following situations:
– k
uw+!k
wu < 
k
ue: in this case bidding bk
ew  !k
wu the website is not in
the best T bidders so it is not visualized and its gain is 0. If it bids
bk
ew > !k
wu the gain is either 0 (if it is not in the best T bidders) or
!k
wu    k
ew = !k
wu   (bk
ew   (k
uew   
k
ue)) = k
uw + !k
wu   
k
ue < 0
So the best move in this situation is to bid bk
ew  !k
wu.
– k
uw + !k
wu  
k
ue: in this case bidding bk
ew  !k
wu the website gets
in the best T websites and gains k
uw + !k
wu   
k
ue > 0. Bidding
bk
ew < !k
wu the websites can either get in the ﬁrst T websites and
gains, as before, k
uw +!k
wu  
k
ue > 0 or not making to be in the ﬁrst
T websites and therefore gains 0. So the best move in this situation
is to bid bk
ew  !k
wu.
So the dominant strategy in both the situations is bidding bk
ew = !k
wu
Corollary 2.3.1.1. With this auction mechanism it is maximize the sys-
tem surplus value.
Proof. The consequence of bk
ew = !k
wu. is that the bid-value is equal to the
match-value (k
uew = 
k
uw). So when the search engine is selecting the
best T website according to k
uew it is actually doing it according to 
k
uw
so the engine surplus value is maximize. Since all the search engines
are following this strategy the system surplus value (that is equal to the
sum of all the engine surplus values) is maximized.
2.3.4 The user payment
We still have to deﬁne what users pays (k
euw). To do that we observe
that, if the estimations of k
uw are the same for all the search engines
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the search engine gain must be 0. In fact all the search engines are
offering the same service and have the same information. If there are
two search engines and ge1 > ge2 it means that users, websites or both
of them gain less using the ﬁrst search engine rather than using the
second. In fact the sum of all the gains (the surplus value) is the same
for all the search engine (it is the maximum surplus value). That means
that users and websites will move to the second search engine to gain
more and the ﬁrst search engine will die. So competition makes the
search engines to low down their gains until they reach the minimum
which is 0.
Having this information we can state that the user payment is the one
that make the search engine gains zero. We see that this happens set-
ting
k
euw = k
uw   
k
ue
Lets in fact calculating the gain for the users, websites, and search en-
gines.
gu =
X
w2Vu
k
uw   k
euw =
X
winu
k
uw   (k
uw   
k
ue) =
= T  
k
e = T  
k
e
gw =
X
u:w2Vu
!k
wu    k
euw =
X
u:w2Vu

k
uw   
k
e =
=
X
u:w2Vu

k
uw   
k
e
ge =
X
u:qu=(e;ku)
X
w2Vu
k
euw +  k
euw =
=
X
u:qu=(e;ku)
X
w2Vu
(k
uw   
k
ue) + (bk
ew   (k
uew   
k
ue) =
=
X
u:qu=(e;ku)
X
w2Vu
k
uw + bk
ew   k
uew = 0
Notice that the users gains as he is being shown the ﬁrst excluded web-
site. The websites gain the difference between their match-value and
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the one from the ﬁrst excluded website. Finally the search engine gains
0 as we wanted.
2.3.5 Example
Let’s show an example with some data (See Figure 2.1). The user search
for the keyword k = "pizza" to a search engine e = "Iauu". There are 4
websites that made a bid for the keyword "pizza" to the search engine
"Iauu".
The ﬁrst website W1 = "ThePizzaEncyclopedia" has high quality infor-
mation about pizza but want to get paid to have access to this infor-
mation. So it has an high positive value for  and a negative value for
!.
The second website W2 = "WeDeliverYourPizza" makes good pizza and
gain from selling it. The user is happy to visit that website and the
website is happy to sell pizza to the users. So both  and ! are positive.
The third website W3 = "BoostYourselfWithPizza" is a spam website
trying to sell some weird product the user don’t need. So it has a low
value for the user ( < 0) and an high value for the website that gains
from selling something useless and overpriced.
The last website W4 = "WikiOpenPizza" is a no proﬁt website with not
that bad content. So  is positive but ! is 0 because the website does not
get anything from being visualized.
Website  ! b     
W1 = "ThePizzaEncyclopedia" 15 -4 -4 11 5
W2 = "WeDeliverYourPizza" 4 5 5 9 3
W3 = "BoostYourselfWithPizza" -3 9 9 6 0
W4 = "WikiOpenPizza" 5 0 0 5 -1
Figure 2.1: Websites parameters
Let’s set T = 2 so the ﬁrst 2 websites are selected and  = 2 = 6.
We have that the user:
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– pays  =
P
i i    = (15   6) + (4   6) = 7
– gets
P
i = 15 + 4 = 19
– gains gu = 19   7 = 12.
The website W1
– pays  1 = b1   (1   ) =  4   (11   6) =  9
– gets !1 =  4
– gains gw1 = !1    1 =  4   ( 9) = +5
The websites W2
– pays  2 = b2   (2   ) = +5   (9   6) = +2
– gets !2 = +5
– gains gw2 = !2    2 = +5   2 = +3
All the other websites (W3 and W4):
– pays 0
– gets 0
– gains 0
The surplus value is
S = gu + gw1 + gw2 = 12 + 5 + 3 = 20
We see that this is equal to S = 
1+
2 = (1+!1)+(2+!2) as predicted
in Section 2.2.1. Notice also that the gain for users and websites are the
same calculated at the end of Section 2.3.
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About noise
In the previous section we have assumed that search engines know ex-
actly the value of a website from the user point of view (k
uw). That is
not always true since inferring users preferences is an hard task. We
can model this lack of information as noise in the value of k
uw. We will
see that good estimation for the user preferences (so low noise on k
uw)
ensures a search engine some gain over its competitors.
3.1 Deﬁnition
Each search engine e has estimate values for k
uw that we call ~ k
uw. We
assume there is additive Gaussian, zero average, noise on the real value
of each parameter. So for each engine e we have that:
~ k
uw = k
uw + N(;0)
So each search engine e has a noise represented by 
3.2 Matching problem with noise
Given the set of users U and the set of websites W we call optimal
matching for a search engine e the matching between users and web-
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sites that maximize the engine surplus value. We call the optimal en-
gine surplus value Sopt. The optimal matching is obtained selecting the
T best websites for each user according to the matching-value 
k
uw. It
means that for each user u, Vu contains the websites wi such that 
k
ui is
in the top T values.
Let’s analyze a scenario in which the entity that matches users and web-
sites has a noisy information about k
uw (and so about 
k
uw) as deﬁned in
Section 3.1. It happens that the optimal matching (so the sets Vu) is
decided according to the noisy values ~ 
k
uw . This matching has a surplus
value of ~ Sopt =
P
u2U
P
w2Vu 
k
uw. Notice that this is calculated using
the real values for 
k
uw. That’s because even if the matching is decided
according to the noisy values the surplus value is still calculated using
the real values.
The auction mechanism change as following:
1. The search engine knows each website bid bk
ew and an estimation of
the user value ~ k
uw for the websites.
2. The search engine order all the websites in descending order ac-
cording to the noisy bid-vales ~ k
uew = ~ k
uw + bk
ew.
3. It selects the ﬁrst T websites according to this rank and put them
in the results set Vu. We call 
k
ue the (noisy) bid-value of the ﬁrst
websites not selected (i.e. the value of ~  for websites in position
T + 1 in the rank)
4. The search engine ask each website that is in the result set Vu to
pay
 k
euw = bk
ew   (~ k
uew   
k
ue)
5. The search engine ask the user to pay
k
euw = ~ k
uw   
k
ue
For each visualized website.
It is easy to prove that the noise low down the expected value for the
engine system surplus value.
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Lemma 3.2.1. Let e1 and e2 be two search engines such that the ﬁrst
one know exactly the values of k
uw while the second one knows them with
noise we get that for each query S1  S2
Proof. That’s obvious. In fact the engine surplus value is the sum of all
the matching-value for each matching done by the engine. The search
engine e1 will select the optimal matching. The search engine e2 will
try to do the same but since the values of 
 are affected by noise it will
include in the result set some websites that should not be in that and
will exclude some valuable website. So the engine surplus value for e2
will be lower or equal than the one of e1
3.2.1 Example
We now provide an example with the same data from Section 2.3.5 (see
Figure 3.1) . In this situation there is noise so the ﬁnal ranking is dif-
ferent.
Website  noise ! b  ~  ~    
W1 = "ThePizzaEncyclopedia" 15 0 -4 -4 11 11 6
W3 = "BoostYourselfWithPizza" -3 +2 9 9 6 8 3
W2 = "WeDeliverYourPizza" 4 -4 5 5 9 5 0
W4 = "WikiOpenPizza" 5 -2 0 0 5 3 -2
Figure 3.1: Websites parameters
Let’s set T = 2 so the ﬁrst 2 websites are selected and  = 3 = 5. Notice
that the values of  that are considered for the ranking are the noisy
ones. In fact the search engine knows the noisy values (~ i) but not the
real ones (i).
We have that the user:
– pays  =
P
i ~ i    = (15   5) + ( 1   5) = 4
– gets
P
i = 15   3 = 12
– gains gu = 12   4 = 8.
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The website W1
– pays  1 = b1   (~ 1   ) =  4   (11   5) =  10
– gets !1 =  4
– gains gw1 = !1    1 =  4   ( 10) = +6
The websites W3
– pays  3 = b3   (~ 2   ) = +9   (8   5) = 6
– gets !3 = +9
– gains gw3 = !3    3 = +9   6 = +3
All the other websites (W2 and W4):
– pays 0
– gets 0
– gains 0
The surplus value is
S = gu + gw1 + gw2 = 8 + 6 + 3 = 17
We see that this is still equal to S = 
1+
3, so it is the sum of the match-
ing values of the selected websites. That’s because the surplus values
does not depend on the payments ( and  ) as we proved in Section 2.2.1.
In this situation the only difference with the situation without noise are
the assignment of the payments. So the surplus value is still equal to
the sum of the matching values of the visualized websites.
Notice also that the surplus value is lower than the one obtained when
there is no noise, as proved in Lemma 3.2.1.
3.2.2 Numeric simulation
We provide a numeric simulation to show the implications of the lemmas
above. In this system there are 10 users, 10 websites and T = 1. That
means that we are matching each user with one website.
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Figure 3.2: Numeric simulation for   =
Sopt S
Sopt function of the noise variance
 and quadratic interpolation ( y = 10 4(0:01592 + 0:0250   0:1944))
We take values for k
uw uniformly distributed in the range ( 400;400).
We than plot the factor   =
Sopt S
Sopt as a function of the variance ()
of the Gaussian noise. For each value of  the noise and the values
for k
uw have been generated 1000 times, 1000 values for S have been
calculated and we took the average. The plot has been generated with
1000 different values of  in the range (0;100). The matlab code for the
numeric simulation can be found in Section 5.1.
As we see from the simulation the value of   has a quadratic relation
with the variance of the noise.
3.3 Consequences of the noise on the market
We realized that the noise on the values of  affects the expected value
of the engine surplus value. We will now see how that also affect the
gain of search engines.
The engine surplus value is the additional value the search engine cre-
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ate from the matching. This additional value has to be distributed be-
tween the three entities of the market: websites, the search engine and
users. That means that with an higher surplus value there is more value
to distribute and so it is easier to make the entities happy. A search
engine that is able to provide an higher surplus value will have more
chances of gain over the other search engines as we see in the following
lemma.
Lemma 3.3.1. If there are two search engine: e1 and e2 such that for
each query S1  S2 we have that e1 can set  > 0 and for each query it
gains ge1 = S1   S2    while ge2 = 0
Proof. The idea is that the ﬁrst search engine has more surplus value
to distribute so it can keep some of it for itself. In fact the ﬁrst search
engine can make the users and the websites gain the same they would
get using the engine e2 plus a little bias. In this way all the users and
the websites using e2 would move to e1 because their gains would be
higher with the latter. In fact for each user u 2 U and for each website
w 2 W we have that the gains of users and websites using the ﬁrst
search engine are:
g0
u = gu + 
g0
w = gw + 
where gu and gw are respectively the gains of the users and of the web-
sites using the second search engine. Setting  such that  = (jWj+jUj)
we get that
X
u2U
g0
u +
X
u2W
g0
w = S2 + 
So we have that
S1 = ge1 +
X
u2U
g0
u +
X
u2W
g0
w = ge1 + S2 + 
and we get
ge1 = S1   S2   
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Conclusion
4.1 Results
We have introduced a web search market model for sponsored search
dividing the entities involved in 3 sets: Users, Websites, Search Engines.
We have deﬁned the action each entity can take and we have introduced
the gain as a measure each entity is trying to maximize.
We have deﬁned the System Surplus Value as the sum of all the gains
and we have shown how that is a measure of the optimality of the match-
ing between users and websites (Section 2.2.1). We have further shown
that a search engine that can provide an higher surplus value can im-
prove its gain (Lemma 3.3.1). From that we have stated that a search
engine will always try to maximize the surplus value trying to provide
optimal matching between users and websites. To do that it needs two
information about each possible matching: !k
wu and k
wu. The former can
be obtain from websites’ bids using a truth-telling auction mechanism
(Lemma 2.3.1), the latter must be inferred by the search engine in some
way. We have modeled the different quality of predictions of k
wu that
different search engines can provide, using a noise model (Section 3.1).
With Lemma 3.2.1 we have shown that the precision of the predictions of
k
wu affects the surplus value provided by the search engine’s matching
and therefore the search engine’s gain (Lemma 3.3.1). In Section 3.2.2
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we have shown with a numeric simulation that there is a quadratic re-
lation between the variance of the noise on the prediction of k
wu and
the expected surplus value of the matching and therefore the search en-
gine’s gain.
This pushes the search engines to invest money in mechanisms trying
to predict users’ preferences and leads to a better quality of search re-
sults. Also high quality websites would gain from that since their qual-
ity would be better recognized.
We can than conclude that according to our model a more open and com-
petitive market for search engines would lead to better quality of search
results and higher gains for both websites and users.
4.2 Limits of the model
We observe that the real web search market is different from what our
model predicts. Search engines keep all the revenue from slot auctions
and the dominant position of Google is difﬁcult to attack. We should
than analyze what are the limits of our model in order to explain why
reality seems to be different from what we predict.
4.2.1 Rationality
We have assumed that all the entities take the best rational decision to
maximize their gain. That is not usually true in reality. Each entity
should develop a tool that can take the best decision. That requires
knowledge and resources. Search engines can usually afford it but we
can’t say the same for websites and users.
Websites should develop a tool that analyze the available search engines
and decide where to place a bid to maximize their gain.
Similarly users need to decide where to submit a query. In order to help
them some meta search engine can be developed. A meta search engine
receives a query from a user, forward it to one or more search engines
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and then process the results in some way to provide a result page to the
user. The meta search engine has the resources to develop smart query
strategies and can keep part of the gain of the queries for itself as its
gain.
4.2.2 Monetization of information
When we deﬁne the gain of users gu =
P
w2Vu(k
uw   k
euw) we assume
that there is a way to convert the information received from the search
results into money. That might be hard and very subjective. The point
is that it doesn’t have to be done explicitly. The user can directly "feel"
his gu without explicitly converting k
uw into money and can than decide
whether it worths to carry on using that search engine. On the other
hand search engines, given some website value measure they obtain
from ranking algorithms, can learn how to convert it into money check-
ing how much the users are willing to pay (i.e. what is the ranking-
money conversion that makes the user stop using the search engine)
4.2.3 Few search engines
The model assume that there are enough search engines such that the
competition is real and it is difﬁcult to reach a cartel agreement between
competitors. But in reality there are few quality search engines. That
is because search engines need a huge amount of computational power
and storage so few companies can afford to start one.
The model doesn’t actually assume that there are many search engines.
It just requires that there is real competition between them. To assure
that it is sufﬁcient that there is at least one quality search engine that
keep little gain for itself (just to pay off the structure it needs). It might
be an idea for a no-proﬁt organization with enough resources to start a
search engine with these characteristics in order to increase the compe-
tition in the web search market and get the results we have described
in this thesis.
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4.2.4 Transfer money at each query
In our model money is transfered between users and search engines and
between websites and search engines at each query. Websites are used
to do that since the bidding schemes that are actually implemented in
the main search engines requires that1. On the contrary users are not
used to exchange money at each query.
Users might don’t like the idea of spending money for searching even if
for some query they might actually receive money. That can again be
solved with meta search engines that can provide the search service for
free to users that are not interested in gaining from searching and that
want just a easy way to search information. The meta search engine can
keep a balance for each user and provide free search service until the
sum of all the payments the users own to the search engine is positive.
For providing this service it can keep this positive amount. Of course
more skilled users can contact directly the search engines without using
meta search engines.
4.2.5 Search engines could not accept to share revenue
Our model predict that users and websites can participate in search en-
gine revenue. That should be enough to prove that this is possible under
our assumptions. By the way it is useful to provide some evidences of
this already happening in reality on similar situations.
Youtube provide a Partner program for revenue sharing[15]. Creator
of original contents can earn revenue allowing relevant advertisements
to be displayed with their videos and getting part of the revenue from
advertising. HubPages has a similar program for user generated articles
[1].
Revenue sharing in advertising market also happens in those websites
that abuse of the pay per click mechanism to make money. Those web-
sites usually create pages with many ads from some ad network (i.e.
1Payments usually happen on per-click base instead of per-view (and so at each query) but
since there is a linear relation between views and clicks it doesn’t make any difference.
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AdSense) and then pay users to click on ads, sharing with them part of
the revenue. This mechanism is known as click fraud and advertising
network have tools to try to prevent it.
4.2.6 Are then the results realistic?
Our model is of course a simpliﬁcation of reality and has some limits.
But as we have shown above these limits can be easily overcome. Dif-
ferent and more complete models can be developed for example using a
per-click payment scheme (we use a per-view), giving different values to
the available T slots (in our model they all have the same value) and
taking into consideration reputation and net effect, but our results will
still be valid. In fact our model is founded on few simple assumptions
that still hold in more complex models: rationality of entities, monetiza-
tion of information, competition between entities, uncertainty on user-
website matching values. Therefore the results that come from those
assumption are still valid in more complex models.
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Appendix
5.1 Numeric simulation matlab code
clc ; clear ;
N = 10; % users/websistes
max_val = 400; %values from  max_val to max_val
max_epsilon = max_val /4; % values of noise from  max_epsilon
% to max_epsilon
avg_steps = 1000;
epsilon_steps = 1000;
epsilon = zeros( epsilon_steps ,1);
ratio = zeros( epsilon_steps ,1);
S_noise_avg = zeros( epsilon_steps ,1);
S_real_avg = zeros( epsilon_steps ,1);
for l =1: epsilon_steps
epsilon ( l ) = max_epsilon  ( l / epsilon_steps );
S_noise = zeros( avg_steps ,1);
S_real = zeros( avg_steps ,1);
for k=1:avg_steps
ni_real = 2(max_val)rand(N,N)   max_val;
ni_real = tril ( ni_real );
ni_real = ni_real + tril ( ni_real ) ’;
for i =1:N
ni_real ( i , i ) = ni_real ( i , i )/2;
end
omega_real = 2(max_val)rand(N,N)   max_val;
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omega_real = tril (omega_real );
omega_real = omega_real + tril (omega_real ) ’;
for i =1:N
omega_real( i , i ) = omega_real( i , i )/2;
end
gamma_real = ni_real + omega_real ;
noise = normrnd(0 , epsilon ( l )/2 ,N,N); %gaussian noise
noise = tril ( noise );
noise = noise + tril ( noise ) ’;
ni_noise = ni_real + noise ;
gamma_noise = ni_noise + omega_real
[ values , indices ] = max(gamma_noise , [ ] , 2 ) ;
for i =1:N
S_noise (k)= S_noise (k) + gamma_real( i , indices ( i ) ) ;
end
S_real (k) = sum(max(gamma_real , [ ] , 2 ) ) ;
end
S_noise_avg ( l ) = mean( S_noise );
S_real_avg ( l ) = mean( S_real );
end
p = polyfit ( epsilon ,( S_real_avg   S_noise_avg ) . / S_real_avg ,2)
plot ( epsilon ,( S_real_avg   S_noise_avg ) . / S_real_avg , ’ .b ’ ,
0:0.05: max_epsilon , polyval(p,0:0.05: max_epsilon ) , ’ k ’ ,
’LineWidth ’ , 3)
ylabel( ’\Gamma’ )
xlabel( ’\sigma ’ )
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